

Message Text

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AMEMBASSY BONN

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AMEMBASSY ANKARA

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 VIENNA 10296

E.O. 11652:

TAGS:

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: PLENARY STATEMENT BY HEAD OF
SOVIET DELEGATION (O.N. KHLESTOV), DECEMBER 13, 1973

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS FROM US REP MBFR

ANKARA FOR DELIVERY TO NATO DEPARTMENT TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTRY

TRANSMITTED HERewith IS PLENARY STATEMENT OF HEAD OF SOVIET
DELEGATION (KHLESTOV), DECEMBER 13, 1973. TEXT FOLLOWS:

DISTINGUISHED CHAIRMAN, GENTLEMEN:

1. A MONTH AND A HALF HAVE PASSED SINCE THE DAY OF THE OPENING OF
OUR NEGOTIATIONS. DURING THIS TIME WE HAVE EXCHANGED OPINIONS
WITH SUFFICIENT THOROUGHNESS ON A WIDE RANGE OF QUESTIONS RELATED
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TO THE PROBLEM OF MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS

IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THE PLENARY MEETINGS HAVE, ON THE WHOLE, PROCEEDED IN A BUSINESS-LIKE ATMOSPHERE AND, ALONG WITH THE UNOFFICIAL MEETINGS AND CONVERSATIONS, THEY HAVE DOUBTLESS BEEN OF USE TO ALL OF US FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF CLARIFYING THE POSITIONS OF THE SIDES ON THE ESSENCE OF THE PROBLEM UNDER CONSIDERATION. NOTING ALL THESE POSITIVE SIDES OF THE PAST DISCUSSIONS, WE AT THE SAME TIME CANNOT FAIL TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE FACT THAT NO REAL MOVEMENT IN THE DIRECTION OF SOLUTION OF THE TASK BEFORE US HAS YET BEEN NOTED. IN THE OPINION OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION, WE SHOULD NOT CLOSE OUR EYES TO THOSE DIFFICULTIES WHICH WE HAVE ALREADY RUN INTO AND WHICH ARE THE CONSEQUENCE OF ESSENTIAL DIVERGENCES IN THE APPROACH OF THE SIDES TO THE SUBJECT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

2. FROM THE EXCHANGE OF OPINIONS WHICH HAVE TAKEN PLACE, THERE EMERGES A SERIES OF IMPORTANT CONCLUSIONS FOR OUR FURTHER WORK, ON WHICH IT SEEMS TO US IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO PONDER DURING THE TIME WE WILL HAVE UNTIL OUR NEXT MEETING.

3. WE ALL AGREE THAT PRECISELY AS A RESULT OF THE WELL-KNOWN POSITIVE MOVES IN EUROPE AND IN THE WORLD AS A WHOLE, NECESSARY PRECONDITIONS WERE CREATED FOR THE HOLDING OF NEGOTIATIONS ON THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE WITH THE AIM OF STRENGTHENING THE SECURITY OF EUROPEAN STATES AT LOWER LEVELS OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS. ALL PARTICIPANTS HAVE CONFIRMED IN STATEMENTS THEIR INTENTION TO CONDUCT A REDUCTION OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS ON THE BASIS OF THE PRINCIPLES AGREED AT THE PREPARATORY CONSULTATIONS AND TO WORK OUT WITH THIS AIM CONCRETE MEASURES ON THE EXTENT AND TIMING IN SUCH A WAY THAT IN ALL RESPECTS AND AT ANY MOMENT THEY CORRESPOND TO THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY OF ANY OF THE SIDES.

4. AT THE SAME TIME, IF WE TAKE THE POSITION OF THE PARTICIPANTS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE ESSENCE OF THE PROBLEM UNDER CONSIDERATION

,
AS THEY HAVE BEEN PRESENTED OVER THE COURSE OF THE LAST MONTH AND A HALF, ONE CANNOT FAIL TO COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT IN THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS TWO APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM OF FUTURE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE HAVE APPEARED IN RELIEF: THE APPROACH OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES
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AND THE APPROACH OF THE WESTERN STATES. THESE TWO APPROACHES HAVE FOUND THEIR MOST PRECISE REFLECTION IN THOSE DOCUMENTS WHICH THE TWO SIDES HAVE PRESENTED FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

5. THE APPROACH OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES IS DEFINED BY THE FACT THAT IN STRIVING TO DEEPEN THE PROCESS OF DETENTE IN EUROPE AND STRENGTHEN SECURITY ON THIS CONTINENT, THEY PROCEED FROM THE FACT

THAT THE MAIN TASK OF THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS IS TO WORK OUT AN AGREEMENT ON THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THAT IS WHY THE GDR, POLAND, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, AND THE SOVIET UNION, AS STATES-PARTICIPANTS OF FUTURE AGREEMENTS, CONSIDERED IT NECESSARY TO INTRODUCE AT THE VERY BEGINNING OF THE NEGOTIATIONS--ON 8 NOVEMBER--A DRAFT OF SUCH AN AGREEMENT. BY TABLING THIS DOCUMENT, THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES TRIED TO PUT THE NEGOTIATIONS IMMEDIATELY ON THE TRACK OF BUSINESS-LIKE, CONSTRUCTIVE DISCUSSIONS.

6. I SHOULD LIKE ESPECIALLY TO STRESS THAT THE PRACTICAL STEPS ON REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS OF ALL ELEVEN POTENTIAL PARTICIPANTS OF A FUTURE AGREEMENT IN CENTRAL EUROPE, PROPOSED IN THE DRAFT AGREEMENT OF THE SOCIALIST STATES, FULLY CORRESPONDS TO THE PRINCIPLES AGREED AT THE PREPARATORY CONSULTATIONS. THIS DRAFT REPRESENTS A PRECISE, CLEAR PROGRAM OF MEASURES ON REDUCTION WHICH WAS CAREFULLY WORKED OUT AS TO TIMING, SCOPE AND EXTENT. THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES START WITH THE FACT THAT THE DEVELOPMENT OF A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT ON THE BASIS OF THEIR DRAFT ON THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE WOULD PERMIT, AS EARLY AS 1975, THE BEGINNING OF REALISTIC REDUCTION OF TROOPS AND ARMAMENTS WHICH CONFRONT EACH OTHER IN THIS AREA. SUCH AN AGREEMENT WOULD SUBSTANTIALLY STRENGTHEN POLITICAL DETENTE WITH A MILITARY DETENTE, AND WOULD FURTHER THE STRENGTHENING OF PEACE AND SECURITY ON THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT. IT WOULD PROVIDE EQUAL TERMS FOR ALL THE PARTICIPANTS AND WOULD NOT GRANT ANYONE ONE-SIDED MILITARY ADVANTAGES.

7. THE DRAFT AGREEMENT ACCURATELY DEFINES THE ARA, THE STAGES AND THE TIME TABLE FOR THE REDUCTION OF FOREIGN AS WELL AS NATIONAL ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS, INCLUDING GROUND FORCES, AIR FORCES AND ALSO UNITS AND SUBUNITS EQUIPPED WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS. IT TAKES INTO ACCOUNT THE CLOSE INTERDEPENDENCE OF THE CONFIDENTIAL

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VARIOUS BRANCHES OF SERVICE AND ARMAENTS, AND ALSO OF THE FOREIGN AND NATIONAL COMPONENTS OF THESE FORCES. THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES PROPOSE THAT IN THE FIRST STAGE THE ARMED FORCES BE REDUCED BY EQUAL NUMBERS; WHILE IN THE TWO SUBSEQUENT STAGES-ON AN EQUAL PERCENTAGE BASIS.

8. THE DELEGATIONS OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAVE DEMONSTRATED THAT THE COMPREHENSIVE REDUCTION METHODS PROPOSED BY THEM WOULD ENCOMPASS ALL TYPES

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MBFR NEGOTIATIONS FROM US REP MBFR

OF FOREIGN AND NATIONAL FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE, I.E.,
GOUND FORCES, AIR FORCES AND ARMAMENTS, INCLUDING UNITS AND SUBUNITS
EQUIPPED WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND TAKES STRICTLY INTO ACCOUNT
THE EXISTING REALITIES IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND PERMITS THE CARRYING
OUT THE REDUCTION WITHOUT DISTURBING THE EXISTING RELATIONSHIP
OF FORCES IN THIS AREA.

9. THE LOGIC OF INCLUDING IN A FUTURE AGREEMENT ALL TYPES OF
FOREIGN AND NATIONAL ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS STEMS FROM THE
UNDERSTANDING REACHED BY US THAT DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS THE
QUESTION WILL BE EXAMINED--AND I ESPECIALLY STRESS THIS POINT--
OF A MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND
ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. STARTING WITH THIS UNDERSTANDING,
THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES PROPOSE THAT THE FORCES OF THE USA AND USSR
BE REDUCED AS WELL AS THOSE OTHER POTENTIAL PARTICIPATING
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STATES IN A FUTURE AGREEMENT. WE ARE IN FAVOR OF THE CONCLUSION

OF A MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT ON THE REDUCTION IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND OF ALL COUNTRIES HAVING TROOPS AND ARMAMENTS IN THIS IMPORTANT STRATEGIC AREA MAKING THEIR CONTRIBUTION TO THE CAUSE OF MILITARY DETENTE. IT IS PRECISELY FOR THIS REASON THAT WE ARE CONDUCTING THE MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS HERE.

10. ANY ATTEMPTS TO SUBSTITUTE FOR A MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE A REDUCTION OF SOME KIND OF A WILLFULLY SELECTED TYPE OF ARMED FORCES SUCH AS GROUND FORCES AND,

AS THE WESTERN COUNTRIES PROPOSE, ONLY THOSE BELONGING TO TWO STATES, WOULD LEAD TO A CHANGE OF THE RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES WHICH HAS DEVELOPED IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND WOULD GIVE MILITARY ADVANTAGES TO ONE OF THE SIDES.

IT WAS QUITE NATURAL THAT THIS WOULD CONTRADICT THE EXISTING UNDERSTANDING ON THE SUBJECT OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS. PROPOSALS OF THIS KIND CANNOT SERVE AS A BASIS FOR AN AGREEMENT AND IT IS INCOMPREHENSIBLE TO US HOW THEIR AUTHORS, STARTING FROM SUCH POSITIONS, CAN COUNT ON A FRUITFUL CONDUCT OF NEGOTIATIONS.

11. THE SOVIET UNION DOES NOT STRIVE TO GAIN FOR ITSELF ANY KIND OF UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGES. AT THE SAME TIME, IT CANNOT AGREE AND WILL NOT AGREE TO DECISIONS WHICH WOULD GRANT SIMILAR ADVANTAGES TO THE OTHER SIDE.

12. THE PROPOSALS SUBMITTED BY THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES PROVIDE FOR A JUST SOLUTION OF THE QUESTION AND ARE AIMED AT THE CREATION OF A SITUATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE IN WHICH ON BOTH SIDES FAR FEWER MILITARY FORMATIONS, UNITS, AND SUBUNITS EQUIPPED WITH VARIOUS CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD CONFRONT EACH OTHER THAN IS NOW THE CASE.

THE ACHIEVEMENT OF SUCH A RESULT WOULD BE A BENEFIT TO ALL AND UNDOUBTEDLY WOULD BE MET WITH APPROVAL BY ALL PEOPLES AND WORLD PUBLIC OPINION. SUCH IS OUR APPROACH- THE APPROACH OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES PARTICIPATING IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

13. AND WHAT HAVE WE HEARD IN RESPONSE TO OUR PROPOSALS FROM THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES? THE WESTERN COUNTRIES, AS IS EVIDENT FROM THE STATEMENTS OF THEIR DELEGATIONS

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AND FROM THEIR DOCUMENTS, SEE AS THE AIM OF THE NEGOTIATIONS NOT A MUTUAL AND JUST REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE, BUT A REDUCTION, WHICH IN ESSENCE WOULD LEAD TO A CHANGE TO THEIR BENEFIT OF THE RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES WHICH HAS DEVELOPED. AS JUSTIFICATION OF SUCH A POSITION REFERENCES ARE MADE TO ALLEGED DISPROPORTIONS EXISTING IN THE SIZE AND DEPLOYMENT OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS OF THE SIDES, WHICH IN THE WORDS OF WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES IT IS ESSENTIAL TO REMOVE OR TO COMPENSATE FOR. IT WOULD BE HARDLY WORTHWHILE

TO TALK NOW IN DETAIL ABOUT THE POINT THAT THE CONCEPT OF "DISPROPORTIONS" PRESENTED BY THE WESTERN COUNTRIES IS BUT AN ARTIFICIAL, CONTRIVED CONCEPT BASED ON FIGURES CHOSEN AT RANDOM. THIS WAS ALREADY CONVINCINGLY DEMONSTRATED AND WELL ARGUED IN THE STATEMENTS OF THE DELEGATIONS OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES.

14. WHAT DO THE WESTERN PROPOSALS AMOUNT TO? IN EFFECT, SOVIET GROUND FORCES STATIONED IN CENTRAL EUROPE BASICALLY MUST BE SUBJECT TO REAL REDUCTIONS. THEY PROPOSE THAT WE WITHDRAW FROM THE REDUCTION AREA 68,00 MEN AND 1700 TANKS, BUT AS FAR AS THE UNISTED STATES IS CONCERNED, IT WOULD REDUCE ITS TROOPS BY ONLY 29,000 MEN. ALSO, WHILE IT IS PROPOSED THAT THE SOVIET SHOULD WITHDRAW A TANK ARMY CONSISTING OF 5 DIVISIONS, THE U.S. AS IT APPEARS IN THE DOCUMENT OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES, DATED NOVEMBER 22 OF THIS YEAR, WILL WITHDRAW FROM CENTRAL EUROPE MERELY MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES ON AN INDIVIDUAL BASIS OR BY SUB-UNITS. IT BECOMES CLEAR FROM THIS SCHEME OF THINGS PROPOSED BY WESTERN COUNTRIES THAT IN ESSENCE ON IS TALKING ABOUT A UNILATERAL REDUCTION, TO WHICH THE SOVIET UNION WILL NEVER GIVE ITS CONSENT.

15. THE WESTERN COUNTRIES -- AND WE CANNOT FAIL TO NOTICE IT- DO NOT PROVIDE AT ALL FOR A REDUCTION OF ARMS AND COMBAT TECHNOLOGY OF THE US WHICH WILL REMAIN IN STORAGE IN THE REDUCTION ZONE. SUCH A PROPOSAL CLEALY CONTRADICTS THE PRINCIPLES AGREED DURING THE PREPARATORY CONSULTATIONS DURING WHICH WE HAD AGREED THAT THE SUBJECT OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS SHALL BE MUTAL REDUCTION IN CENTRAL EUROPE OF ARMED FORCES AS WELL AS -- AND I WISH TOSTRESS THIS--OF ARMAMENTS. THIS UNDERSTANDING IS CONTRADICTED BY THE DESIRE OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES TO ALSO EXCLUDE FROM THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES UNITS AND SUB-UNITS EQUIPPED WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS. IT IS QUITE OBVIOUS THAT THE
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ACCEPTANCE OF SUCH PROPOSALS WOULD LEAD TO UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGES FOR THE NATO COUNTRIES. SUCH AN APPROACH CANNOT BE CONSIDERED AS REALISTIC AND AS ENSURING THE ATTAINMENT OF UNDERSTANDING, NOT TO MENTION THE FACT THT IT IS IN NO WAY CONNECTED WITH THE AGREED PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY OF ANY OF THE SIDES.

16. THE DELEGATIONS OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES, CONCENTRATING THEIR ATTENTION ON THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS

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OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE US, IN EFFECT LEAVE TO ONESIDE THE QUESTION OF HOW THE WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES IN CENTRAL EUROPE WILL REDUCE THEIR ARMED FORCES. IT FOLLOWS FROM THE PROPOSALS OF THE WEST THAT THEY ARE PROPOSING TO US TO BE SATISFIED WITH UNDEFINED AND VAGUE PROMISES ON HOW, ONLY AFTER TWO COUNTRIES REDUCE THEIR TROOPS IN CENTRAL EUROPE, WE MAY THEN OCCUPY OURSELVES WITH CONSIDERATION OF THE QUESTION OF REDUCTION OF THE ARMED FORCES OF OTHER COUNTRIES WHICH ARE A PART OF THE REDUCTION ZONE.

17. SUCH EXAMINATION MUST TAKE PLACE DURING SOME UNDEFINED SECOND PHASE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. IN ADDITION, NEITHER THE EXTENT OF REDUCTIONS OF TROOPS AND ARMAMENTS OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES NOR THE DATES OF THE BEGINNING AND END OF SUCH REDUCTIONS ARE INDICATED. REFERENCES ARE MADE TO THE FACT THAT THESE QUESTIONS ALLEGEDLY MAY NOT BE DECIDED IN THE GIVEN PHASE. SUCH ARGUMENTS LOOK LIKE A PRETEXT INVOKED TO
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JUSTIFY A REFUSAL TO REDUCE ARMED FORCES. WE ARE GAINING THE IMPRESSION THAT THE WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES -- AND AMONG THEM SUCH STATES PARTICIPANTS OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS WHICH ARE POWERFUL

IN THE MILITARY SENSE, LIKE ENGLAND AND THE FRG -- ARE TRYING TO AVOID ANY REDUCTIONS OF THEIR TROOPS AND ARMAMENTS ALTOGETHER.

18. THE SOLUTION OF THE TASK BEFORE US -- THE ACHIEVEMENT OF MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT ON THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND AMRAMENTS, CANNOT BE PROMOTED BY THE PROPOSALS ADVANCED BY THE WESTERN COUNTRIES ON MEASURES NOT CONNECTED WITH REDUCTION BUT CONCERNING THE ACTIVITIES OF ARMED FORCES. THESE PROPOSALS, IN ESSENCE, HAVE NO RELATION TO THE SUBJECT OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS, AND ATTEMPTS OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES AGAIN AND AGAIN TO ADVANCE THEM CANNOT OTHERWISE BE REGARDED THAN AN ATTEMPT TO COMPLICATE OUR NEGOTIATIONS. THIS QUESTION HAS ALREADY BEEN EXAMINED FROM ALL POINTS OF VIEW IN THE STATEMENTS OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, AND THEREFORE WE DO NOT NEED TO RETURN TO IT.

19. THE SOVIET DELEGATION, AS THE DELEGATIONS OF OTHER SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, PROCEED FROM THE FACT THAT SEVEN STATES ARE LOCATED ON THE AGREED AREA OF FUTURE REDUCTIONS -- BELGIUM, LUXEMBOURG, THE NETHERLANDS, THE FRG, THE GDR, POLAND, AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA, CONCERNING WHICH UNDERSTANDING WAS REACHED AT THE PREPARATORY CONSULTATIONS. AS REGARD STHE STATEMENTS OF CERTAIN WESTERN COUNTRIES MADE IN OUR PLENARY MEETINGS TO THE EFFECT THAT THE QUESTION OF THE INCLUSION OF HUNGARY IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS REMAINS OPEN, THE DISTINGUISHED HEAD OF THE HUNGARIAN DELEGATION, COMRADE PETRAN HAS ALREADY STATED HERE AS FOLLOWS: "HUNGARY MAY WEIGH THE QUESTION OF ITS PARTICIPATION IN POSSIBLE DECISIONS, AGREEMENTS, OR MEASURES ONLY IN THE EVEN THAT THE APPROPRIATE CONDITIONS ARE FULFILLED. THESE CONDITIONS ARE WELL KNOWN TO THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. THAT IS OUR UNALTERABLE POSITION". WE FULLY SUPPORT THIS STATEMENT OF THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE HUNGARIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC.

20. MR. CHAIRMAN, GENTLEMEN, THE SOVIET UNION, AS WE HAVE ALREADY EMPHASIZED, ATTACHES GREAT SIGNIFICANCE TO THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND IS READY TO MAKE ITS CONTRIBUTION TO THEIR
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SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION. WE FAVOR HONEST, BUSINESS-LIKE AND SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS AND CONSIDER THAT THE ADVANCING OF SUCH PROPOSALS WHICH PURSUE THE AIM OF OBTAINING UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGES DO NOT SERVE THE INTERESTS OF THE CAUSE. OUR APPROACH TO THE SOLUTION OF THE QUESTION UNDER CONSIDERATION, WHICH RECEIVED ITS CONCRETE REFLECTION IN THE DRAFT AGREEMENT OF THE FOUR SOCIALIST STATES, WAS DICTATED BY THE DESIRE TO ASSURE THE ACHIEVEMENT OF AGREEMENT ON THE AGREED MULTILATERAL REDUCTION OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN THE CENTER OF THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT, THE JUNCTION OF THE ZONES OF ACTIVITY OF THE MILITARY BLOCS OPPOSING ONE ANOTHER.

21. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION, L.I. BREZHNEV, DURING HIS SPEECH ON NOVEMBER 29 OF THIS YEAR DURING HIS VISIT TO INDIA EMPHASIZED:

"THIS, AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, MUST BE A REDUCTION WHICH WILL NOT GIVE UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES TO ANY ONE SIDE AND WHICH WOULD ALSO STRENGTHEN GENERAL SECURITY AND MUTUAL TRUST. THE SOVIET UNION MAKES NO CLAIM TO MILITARY ADVANTAGES FROM THE INTENDED REDUCTIONS AND, OF COURSE, CANNOT AGREE THAT THE OTHER SIDE SHOULD GAIN THEM. THIS SHOULD BE VERY CLEAR".

22. FROM PRECISELY THESE POSITIONS DOES THE SOVIET DELEGATION APPROACH THE SUBJECT OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS. FROM THIS POINT OF VIEW WE ALSO EXAMINE THE PROPOSALS PRESENTED BY THE DELEGATIONS OF WESTERN COUNTRIES. WE THINK THAT THE APPROACH OF THE WESTERN STATES

IN THE FORM IN WHICH THE DOCUMENT OF NOVEMBER 22 IS PRESENTED WILL NOT LEAD TO THE SOLUTION OF THE TASK BEFORE US. WE WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT DURING THE RECESS OUR WESTERN PARTNERS WILL ONCE AGAIN ATTENTIVELY STUDY AND WEIGH THE PROPOSALS AND CONSIDERATIONS PRESENTED BY THE DELEGATIONS OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES.

(IMPROMPTU STATEMENT) THE SOVIET DELEGATION WOULD LIKE TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO WISH ALL THE OTHER DELEGATIONS A HAPPY NEW YEAR AND EXPRESSES THE HOPE THAT WHEN WE RECONVENE AFTER THE RECESS OUR WORK WILL BE PRODUCTIVE AND FRUITFUL. THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION, MR. CHAIRMAN. END TEXT. MOWINCKEL

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